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INTRODUCTION

Historically an inherent conflict has existed between the exercise
of governmental power and the interests of individuals in minimizing
the effects of that exercise upon them. The debate has evolved around
the proper use of the police power of government. To ensure limited
encroachment upon the lives of private persons, the courts devised
various tests of reasonableness. At the common law, these tests were
originally employed to check the arbitrary and lawless actions of the
crown. Courts tested the limits upon governmental excess under a
due process standard. In a civilized legal system, every person is
entitled to fair treatment from government if the government attempts
to deprive those persons of a cognizable liberty or property right.
The genealogy of due process is one of multiple parentage. Procedural elements can be found in the Magna Carta and many of the
advances in human rights in the seventeenth century. Substantive
origins, although less definite, may nevertheless claim roots in the
clashes giving rise to the Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, and
the ultimate supremacy of the English Parliament. In England, however, supremacy of law was secondary to supremacy of parliament.
Lord Coke's supremacy of law only flourished in the colonies under
due process.
Due process of law has become so important to the ordering of
constitutional priorities that the late Lon Fuller labeled it the inner
morality of law; the morality that makes law possible.' For Fuller,
eight conditions of inner morality are necessary for the very existence
of law: (1) laws must be generalized as rules; (2) laws must be made
public; (3) laws must impose liability for prospective, not retroactive,
acts; (4) laws must be clear, not vague; (5) laws must avoid practical
contradictions; (6) laws should not require the impossible; (7) laws
should be sufficiently stable in order to insure reliance; and (8) laws
must be implemented according to their terms. 2 Fuller presented these
conditions as the very touchstone of law. They are fundamental and
procedural, and conformity to them is a precondition to the existence
of a civilized legal system. They are found in the United States Constitution under the bold heading due process. Without due process,
application of the rules we live by would be less than meaningful.
Due process is a critical element in our legal system - the foundation of rights. It identifies the goals and aims of government and

1. L.
2.

FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW

33 (1964).

Id. at 39.
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modifies them when they are in conflict with foundational rights of
individuals. The goal of due process is to specify a set of rights that
implements claims necessary to promote the individual guarantees set
forth within the foundational theories emerging from the Constitution.
One such foundational theory holds that persons are to be protected
from unreasonable governmental interference, including that which
occurs without physical intrusion. In Katz v. United States,3 the Court
concluded the Constitution protects, among other interests, invasions
of recognizable privacy rights. In other words, the fourth amendment
is exercised to protect those foundational rights that are also obtained
within its language. Thus, protection recognizes a right of privacy
and, as such, ensures security from "writs of assistance." 4 The fourth
amendment is an essential component of the foundational theory of
privacy because it is designed to ensure prohibition against unlawful
governmental invasion of privacy of the person or the home.5 Justice
Frankfurter noted that historical evidence surrounding the drafting
of the fourth amendment suggests no limits upon either "search and
seizure" or "persons, houses, papers and effects. ' '6 Therefore, if reliable
and reproducible facts are available, the fourth amendment will balance
in favor of the governmental interest and allow the entry. For those
instances in which independent judicial scrutiny is required and the
facts are not reliable, or the invasion is otherwise in violation of the
fourth amendment, the Court has devised a scheme of excluding
"tainted evidence."
The history of the fourth amendment, thus, became the history of
the warrant clause. The warrant clause was defined not by the right

3. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. It would appear that the primary abuse of the General Warrant and the Writ of Assistance
was their indiscriminate quality. Because they were a license to search without any real cause,
they were an affront to all who held the '"ights of Englishmen" dear. See 2 T. MAY, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 247 (3d ed. 1882).
5. See generally Amsterdam, Perspective on the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349 (1974). See also T. Baker, "The Right of the People to be Secure.. .": Toward a Metatheory
of the Fourth Amendment (1986) (unpublished manuscript, Texas Tech. Univ.) (identifying the
elements of a theory that would recognize the dualism of the fourth amendment: that "people
have a right to be secure from government and from themselves"); Morrissette, The Exclusion
of Evidence Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: What to Do and What Not
to Do, 29 McGILL L.J. 521 (1984) (urging that Canada adopt balanced principle of discretionary
enforcement rather than a "shock to the conscience" test).
6. See generally J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 20
(1966) (discussing Frankfurter's belief that the fourth amendment "was designed to prevent the
recurrence of a specific historical grievance and that its meaning therefore did not change with

the ebb and flow of events").
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but by the wrong. The exclusionary rule came into being and, by
analogy, began to service the fourth amendment warrant clause, in a
specialized manner, as an equivalency of the procedural due process
clause of the fifth amendment. As such, the exclusionary rule became
fundamental to the condition of legality of the fourth amendment; a
candidate for enshrinement within the inner morality circle. An understanding of the argument requires an analysis of the rule itself. The
fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The amendment reflects a dual purpose within its fifty-four words.
This duality has created tensions ever since courts began to interpret
its language. It is axiomatic that judges have a duty to uphold the
Constitution above and beyond any rules or regulations calling for
exclusion or implementation. That duty involves the integrity of the
Constitution and fidelity to its goal. The dual purpose reflected within
the fourth amendment gives judges insight into its goal.
First and foremost, the fourth amendent serves as an article of
faith; faith in our government's inner morality. Hence, invasion of
individual rights should not occur without clear and articulated reasons
published before a disinterested judicial officer. The judicial officer
must then weigh the invasion of the person, home, papers, or effects
against the more pragmatic concerns of government in its effort to
protect itself and its citizens from those who would do violence to the
good order of society. To avoid unreasonable invasion of humanity and
privacy, the judicial officer must understand the premise by which
fourth amendment theory operates. Theoretically, nothing more should
be needed to ensure the integrity of this process, yet all too often the
government or judicial officer fails to comprehend the premise and
structure of the fourth amendment. When that occurs and an unreasonable invasion of humanity results, the claimed interest in privacy is
thought to be so important that it becomes an end in itself. When
invasion of privacy becomes an end in itself it must be directly resolved. If the government is the invader and the invaded is charged with
criminal sanctions, the result is, for better or worse, exclusion of any
tainted evidence obtained during the invasion.
Thus, the exclusionary rule requires the exclusion of evidence from
the guilt determination phase of the criminal justice system. The exclusion of evidence occurs when a court determines that such evidence

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss2/16

4

Baldwin: Due Process and the Exclusionary Rule: Integrity and Justificatio
EXCLUSIONARY RULE

was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment or in violation of
the fourth amendment as incorporated into the fourteenth amendment.
As noted, this rule reflects a philosophy that recognizes and demands
governmental respect for persons, their houses, and their "papers and
effects" while acknowledging a governmental right to seek and punish
criminal behavior. The rule does not deter crime or free large numbers
of guilty or dangerous criminals, but simply guarantees the integrity
of the guilt determination process.
For over one hundred years, from the United States Supreme
Court's initial flirtation with the exclusionary rule in 1886 to the
Court's present term, exclusionary issues have stimulated an overwhelming number of cases and comments. The more recent cases,
many of which probably were never intended to be candidates for
protection under Mapp v. Ohio,7 riddle the fourth amendment with
less than impressive jurisprudential development. In fact, case law
continues to avoid development of an underlying premise. Reality has
failed to conform to theory and theory has neglected to inform reality.
The most noteworthy aspect of a review of the cases and commentaries
is their sheer volume. At best, the volume is stifling; at worst, it is
counterproductive. Fourth amendment exclusionary analysis, presently and in the recent past, is less than majestic; judicial review is
hypothesized by the individual record in a given case. The law as the
Comt's mistress has become the facts as the Court's child. Thus, the
Court tends to generalize from facts rather than specialize in theoretical concepts. The instincts for constitutional adjudication of the fourth
amendment have given way to a field study of criminal and police
activity. Perhaps the impact of the volume of cases from various state
systems has caused the Court disenchantment. One might suggest
that if the Court had elected to forego review of state exclusionary
complaints, the pure analysis of the fourth amendment would be as
elegant today as in preincorporation times.
Recently, the Court heard arguments in California v. Rooney.8
That case centered around the perplexing question of whether a
reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of fourth and fourteenth
amendment protection extends to garbage placed in a communal trash
bin of a multi-unit apartment complex. The lower court held that
contents in a communal trash bin were not yet abandoned property

7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (maldng inadmissible in state courts all evidence obtained through
unconstitutional search or seizure).
8. 175 Cal. App. 3d 634, 221 Cal. Rptr. (Ct. App. 1985), rev. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3247
(U.S. Oct. 14, 1986) (No. 85-1853).
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that could be seized without either a warrant or probable cause.
Nevertheless, the California court had sufficient good sense to uphold
a search warrant produced after the fact of scavenging, and presumably unrelated thereto, thus permitting the state to again prosecute
the defendants. The question at issue - the expectation of privacy
in an area accessible to the public - was not dispositive of the ultimate
issue and would have been best left for another day. Apparently, the
unfulfilled promise of Katz will be subjected to a test of reasonableness,
cost-benefit, or some other currently popular catch-all phrase in the
next Rooney case. The Court's conclusion will provide answers to the
trash bin issue but will, in all probability, ignore the methodology for
reaching those answers.
The Court, in other words, seems to be more involved in quantity
rather than quality. For example, another recent case captured the
Court's fact imagination with the following record. On the evening of
February 12, 1981, federal task force agents, although unable to obtain
a search warrant, went to the object of their affidavit, the apartment
of a private citizen, Andres Segura. At 11:15 p.m., Segura entered
the lobby of his apartment building and was arrested by the waiting
agents. The agents took Segura to his apartment and entered with
him without requesting or receiving permission. Following a brief
exchange with the other occupants, the agents conducted a "security
check" of the apartment to ensure that no one else was there who
could pose a threat to safety or who could destroy evidence. During
the course of the extensive "security check," the agents found in plain
view, accouterments of drug trafficking. After the security check, the
agents placed another occupant, Luz Colon, under arrest. At that
point, the officers conducted a search incident to Ms. Colon's arrest
and found a loaded revolver in her purse. After Colon, Segura, and
all others were removed to police headquarters, two agents remained
in the apartment and awaited the search warrant. It arrived nineteen
hours later. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger in an
exceptionally cynical opinion, disregarding the fabric of the exclusionary rule and its importance as an implementor of privacy rights and
ignoring the nineteen hour takeover, concluded that the officers did
not act in bad faith. 9

9. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984). The assumption of the majority appears
to be that police would not intentionally act in bad faith while investigating crime. See also
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 290.2 (1975) (determination of motion
to suppress evidence). Segura makes a distinct shift from the Warren Court, which was much
stricter in its scrutiny of police tactics. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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This cynical emasculation of a rule designed to ensure integrity of
process is of little moment as far as the exclusionary rule itself is
concerned, but is of great significance as far as an agency's endorsement of the illegal action of its officers. In fact, the Court in Segura
refused to denounce illegal conduct and indeed, associated itself with
the agency engaged in such conduct. This turn of events is even more
troubling than the out of hand dismissal of the exclusionary rule. In
Segura, the Court became a participant in illegal conduct and failed
to function as a treasured institution designed to protect liberty and
ensure constitutional integrity. The nature of the debate surrounding
the exclusionary rule is clear: how does the Court view the position
of the exclusionary rule within the hierarchy of values it seeks to
protect? As Justice Brandeis stated in Olmstead v. United States:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's surprises are beneficient. Those
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasions of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding. 10
This article is an attempt to expand upon the idea of Justice Brandeis. In so doing, I hope to develop the topic of the conference within
the exclusionary rule setting. My intent is not to plead for the dying
rule, but rather to argue for a proper burial. To do so will require
development of the rule, a discussion of how it achieved its status as
the due process clause of the fourth amendment, and some observations as to what I perceive to be its central purpose - ensuring
integrity within the guilt determination process. 1
The Court's obsession with defining the exclusionary rule solely in
terms of the wrong committed is puzzling. Lower courts appear more
willing to grapple with issues, while the Supreme Court continues to
occupy itself with exclusionary matters that are fact oriented and lack
a perspective capable of identifying an underlying premise of constitutional significances. During this term alone, the Court has accepted

10. 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
11. At present, the bulk of material analyzing the Supreme Court's role in exclusionary
rule matters is so massive that it has become a delicate and valuable art for one simply to sift
through the literature. See, e.g., M. WILKEY, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AmENDmENT BY
ALTERNATIVES TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE (1982); Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio
and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the ExclusionaryRule in Search-and-Seizure Cases. 83 COLUm. L. REV. 1365 (1983).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 16

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

nine exclusionary rule cases for consideration.12 Not one of these cases
is a likely candidate for consideration within the context of the constitutional dualism that continues to tug at fourth amendment methodology.
The Court seems to be moving away from one of its institutional
roles, that of serving as a buffer between other governmental agencies
and people-participants in the social process. A brief look at the development of the constitutional components of the rule, as well as the
Court's functionalist role in it, might facilitate an understanding of
the present judicial preoccupation.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S UNIQUE ROLE IN LIMITING
POWER WITHIN GOVERNMENT

An essential element of formal constitutionalism is the limitation
of government powers. The limitation is established through a predetermined set of rules, or if you will, an internal morality. These
rules are supreme over all that is outside the constitutional framework.
An agency has conferred upon it the power to ensure the limits of
government and to channel governmental interference with individual
liberties within predictable and well-established constitutional principles. The implied duty of the assigned agency, therefore, is to translate
into effective and working reality those predetermined principles of
humankind that are established as a part of the orderly process of
constitutional government. If the Constitution is to endure without
clutter, agencies of constitutional government must, as they have done
in the past, continue to assume not only a creative posture, but a
functional role that ensures constitutional integrity as well.
At least since Calder v. Bull,13 the Supreme Court has struggled
with its role, which is, in part, the articulation and implementation
of certain constitutionally designed principles. In recent times, however, the Court's articulation of these principles seems to ignore the
fundamental conditions of constitutionally established moral imperatives. 14 The first and foremost moral imperative in this constitutional

12. See, e.g., Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d 1269 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. granted
sub nom. Anderson v. Creighton, 106 S. Ct. 3292 (1986); Ortega v. O'Connor, 764 F.2d 703
(9th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 106 S. Ct. 565 (1985); Garrison v. State, 303 Md. 385, 494 A.2d
193 (1985), rev'd sub nom. Maryland v. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987).
13. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). The first congress also struggled with the concept of judicial
review. See generally Casto, The First Congress' Understanding of Its Authority Over the
Federal Courts' Jurisdiction,26 B.C.L. REv. 1101 (1985).

14. I think it is safe to say that the Court in redefining the political question doctrine in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), also redefined its role in the political process. Prior to

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss2/16
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republic is that the people have a right to choose their governmental
leadership. The Court, of course, is not chosen democratically. Yet,
while scholars have attempted to reconcile this disparity, 15 the Court
has, with the acquiescence of the people, taken on the task of Republican Schoolmaster. This task requires judicial integrity and the avoidance of disrepute in the Court's interpretation and implementation
of discovered constitutional principles. To do less would destroy confidence in the Court's ability to assume its constitutional imperative.
The Court, by avoiding the taint of collusion, became a governmental
reality'6 and evolved as the institution best suited to deal with difficult
moral questions.
The Court's role has been and continues to be to search for constitutionally-accepted fundamental principles and to apply them appropriately to the specific question presented. Apparently, the people have
accepted the Court as the intellectual starting point of their search
to understand the principle of inner morality. This principle is constitutionally significant because it establishes the ground rules by which
society conducts its affairs. Thus, we must look to the Court in order
to better understand those elusive "fundamental conditions of legality."'1 7 The Court establishes the necessary constitutional methodology
that must be satisfied before any institution can be judged substantively. The Court sets forth the constitutional premise upon which a
structural theory must rest. Finally, the Court marks the theoretical
and practical boundaries that limit both government and citizen.
With these observations in mind, the intent of this paper is to
focus now upon the Supreme Court and its interpretation of inner
morality. Inner morality, as used in this context, involves those conditions that must be met before the Court can contemplate the rules,
rules designed for compliance. The characteristics of this inner morality

Baker, the Court tended to keep away from the internal workings of the other branches of
government. After Baker, the Court had begun a subtle move into the "political thicket." See
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). The bright line (if there ever was one) between
representative democracy and the role of the Court had dulled considerably. See also L. FULLER,
supra note 1, at 178 (after Baker, the Court will have to "tread a difficult middle course").
15. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
WARREN COURT (1970); L. LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? (1975); Bishin, Judicial Review in
Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099 (1977).
16. See, e.g., Hazard, The Supreme Courtas a Legislature, 64 CORNELL. L. REV. 1 (1978).
17. See L. FULLER, supra note 1, at 95-151. See generally Reisman & Freedman, The
Plaintiffs Dilemma: Illegally ObtainedEvidence and Admissibility in InternationalAdjudication, 76 Am. J. INT'L LAW 737 (1982).
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are found in the operating legal institutions devolving from the Constitution. The inner morality is to be judged quite apart from the
substantial aims of law. The separation is necessary for an implementation of law according to its terms.
This implicates Fuller's eight conditions of inner morality and is
relevant to the exclusionary rule. The present judicial treatment of
the exclusionary rule seems to ignore Fuller's characteristics of inner
morality in that the Court refuses to describe the structure of the
amendment and the assumptions drawn therefrom. The self-fulfilling
pragmatic approach ignores the full range of grace and elegance within
the fourth amendment. An awkward combination results: the impact
of due process upon the internal morality is ignored, while the practicality of the moral status of substantive goals of the governmental
system is honored.
Few areas of human endeavor have so sharply focused this conflict
as has the question of the judicial implementation of these due process
norms because of their impact upon the legal and moral behavior of
the criminal justice system. The concept of law at issue involves the
idea of a rule designed to maximize fourth amendment privacy. The
fourth amendment, as should be apparent, is an important ingredient
within the foundation of our constitutional system. The amendment
has operated as such because, in the past, the Court has served as a
buffer between participants in the social system. In this manner, the
Court became the connecting link between Fuller's notion of an inner
morality of law and external operative rules. The court accomplished
this task of connection by implementing due process standards that
protect against unreasonable governmental intrusion into the home or
person.
This seems simple enough, yet by applying a reasonableness, bright
line, cost-benefit, or other fact-oriented analysis, the present Court
reveals that it is no longer convinced. If the Court is now prepared
to exclude this element of due process protection, then it should at
least be prepared to place its reasoning at a higher level. At a
minimum, the Court should mark the constitutional boundaries that
will continue to ensure the integrity of the constitutional system of
guilt determination. At present, the Court has simply concluded that
deregulation of the exclusionary rule will not adversely affect the
fundamental conditions of legality and their impact upon the fourth
amendment. If the court is prepared to take intellectually this final
step, then the exclusionary rule can rest in peace. History, however,
demonstrates that the Court is actually unwilling to take the final
step, and thus has embroiled itself in trivia, not dynamics.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss2/16
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III.

HISTORY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

An historical examination of the exclusionary rule is essentially
the study of a paradox, liberty and limitation. An overview of the
scholarship analyzing the exclusionary rule captures the struggle inherent in our society. One might timidly suggest that the debate underlying the exclusionary rule is, in reality, a debate about integrity.
Embodied in this concept are individual liberties, such as privacy,
recognized in the Constitution as ends in themselves. Limitations upon
those liberties, required by the Court for the good of the community,
may be imposed only for an overriding social need.
In general, Anglo-American countries have attempted to resolve
these conflicts through written, codified laws governing human behavior. On the one hand, criminal laws govern the most egregious
deviations from prescribed social order. On the other hand, it is beyond
debate that these laws must impose the minimum constraints on individuals in order to ensure maximum personal freedom without jeopardizing the general good.' 8 In the United States, as elsewhere, the key
element to criminal justice is fairness. 19
The critical ingredient in ensuring fairness is integrity. Integrity
should permeate all governmental offices, but does so only in a perfect
world. Even in an imperfect society, it should be found in the police
department, an agency charged with the duty of exercising one of the
most significant of the constitutional police powers; and in the courts
of justice. When addressing the specific issue of integrity, however,
the focus must come to rest on the judiciary, if for no other reason

18. See H. DEAN, JUDICIAL REVIEw AND DEMOCRACY 43-46 (1966) (addressing notions
of democracy and multigroup societies, limitations on majority rule, and conflicting images of
democracy). See generally J. MILL, On Liberty (1859), in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 95-96 (1951) ("[The only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others."). But see P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 102-23 (1965) (refuting
Mill's principles and asserting that individuals must not be allowed such expansive parameters).
19. See C. Gray, The Exclusionary Rule as Constitutional Renewal: American Integrity
and Canadian Repute 8-9 (1986) (unpublished paper delivered at AMINAPHIL Conference,
Univ. Pa.). See also, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

526-33 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing procedural due process as the requirement of fair adjudicative
procedures); Grant, Police Powers: A Question of Balance?, in CIVIL LIBERTIES 103 (P. Wallington ed. 1984) (1983 British police practices legislation fails to promote fair and just criminal
justice system). From a semantic perspective a word like fairness is at best "artfully vague"
and at worst "hopelessly abstract." For a consideration of linguistic limitations in the law and
the need for verbal abstraction, see R. DICKERSON, MATERIALS ON LEGAL DRAFTING 31-63
(1981).
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than because of the inordinate burdens the criminal justice system
places upon out-of-date and under-staffed law enforcement agencies.
Consider the issue in the context of a specific factual question:
May evidence tending to prove the guilt of an accused be heard in
court if the police obtained it in a manner that does violence to the
exclusionary rule? The answer is, or at least has been, that such
illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible.2 0 If, however, the reliable
evidence proves the guilt of the accused, some would argue the obvious
response should be to sustain the conviction on behalf of an overriding
social need. The Court should then, if necessary, institute sanctions
against law enforcement officials who violate established evidence
gathering procedures. In this manner, the inner thread of morality
remains intact.21 Why should a felon responsible for a reprehensible
crime go free because a warrantless search uncovered evidence sufficient for conviction? Why should the system lose its authority to punish
a crime just because a warrant based on hunch rather than probable
cause turned out to be correct? These questions challenge the foundation not only of the exclusionary rule, but also of the very hierarchy
of constitutional values including the judicial responsibility to privacy
protection.
IV.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The exclusionary rule has been justified on numerous grounds since
its imposition on federal courts in Weeks v. United States.2 Justice
Brandeis, in Olmstead, endorsed the idea of exclusion as an implicit
guarantee of privacy derived from a combined reading of the fourth
and fifth amendments.2 The rule has been invoked as an assurance
of a fair trial. 2 More importantly, I suggest, exclusion has been viewed

20. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21. See, e.g., WORKING GROUP FOR ENGLAND AND WALES, THE HANDLING OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE 55-82 (1974); Harris, The Return to Common Sense: A Response
to "The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment," 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 25 (1984).
22. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The fourth amendment, unlike its neighbors, provides us with a
rich historical background. Historians tell us that the fourth amendment is one of the procedural
safeguards growing directly out of events that preceded the Revolution. For an excellent account
of the historical development of the fourth amendment, see B. WILSON, ENFORCING THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: A JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY (1986).
23. 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
24. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 148 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (recognizing the "right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men"); see generally
Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) (laying foundation for
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as an "imperative of judicial integrity"2 based on a kind of "clean
hands" doctrine. 26 As Justice Clark stated in Mapp,2 "[n]othing can
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own
laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."
Another justification, and the one most frequently advanced for
the rule, has been deterrence of police misconduct.2 The rationale
behind the deterrence argument is that the only way to compel police
to respect the constitutional guarantee against unlawful search and
seizure is to remove any potential incentive to disregard the rule.3
The Court's evolving view of these justifications and its gradual reordering of their importance can best be examined by collapsing theory
and reality through selected cases. In this manner, counter examples
might yield judicially-created structure and boundaries.
A.

Emergence of the Rule and Its Impact Upon Federal Courts
1. The Right of Privacy

In Weeks, Justice Day, speaking for a unanimous Court, concluded
that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment was inadmissible in federal criminal trials. The Court concluded that unlawful
searches must not abrogate aspirational goals. The Court recognized
that if it were to allow the admission of letters and private papers
improperly seized from the "citizen accused of an offense, [this] protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against
such searches and seizures [would be] of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.,,31
The Court refused to admit into evidence the documents uncovered
in two warrantless searches of the defendant's room.Y The Court
concluded that the police, if allowed to benefit from the fruits of the

modem privacy right and acknowledging right to protection from government intrusion in one's

home).
25. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
26. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960); see also C. Gray, supra note
19, at 9-10 (discussion of rule of law and equity).
27. 367 U.S. at 659.
28. Id.
29. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
30. Id. But see C. Gray, supira note 19, at 2 (deterrence not the best rationale for exclusionary rule).
31. 232 U.S. at 393.
32. Id. at 398 (holding that admission would be prejudicial error).
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unlawful search, could destroy a right secured by the Constitution. 3
Weeks warned that such an attack on the purpose of the fourth amendment "should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which
are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution .... M
The Court's reasoning in Weeks was compelling and jurisprudentially sound. Although the fourth amendment provides no express
remedy for a violation of its prescription on unlawful search and seizure,5 the exclusionary remedy as it emerged in Boyd v. United
States5 could be nothing short of implicit in the rule. If the right were
never violated, the papers would remain private until officers could
show probable cause to obtain a valid warrant. In many cases, a court
applying hindsight would have to speculate about whether the officer
would have found probable cause. If probable cause had never been
shown, then the contents of the purloined letter would remain forever
the private information of the defendant. So, the only adequate remedy
in such a case would be exclusion of the evidence that would never
have been discovered but for the illegal search.
Although the Court's holding was compelling, it was limited to its
facts. The Weeks opinion mandated exclusion in the federal system of
illegally obtained items in evidence if the defendant were the owner
or intended lawful possessor of the evidence.37 The question whether
the Court would extend fourth amendment protection to exclude improperly seized contraband remained unanswered until the Court's
decision in Agnello v. United States.1
In Agnello, Justice Butler, speaking for the Court, extended fourth
amendment protection to a defendant who was in possession of cocaine,
an offense in violation of federal law. The narcotic was unlawfully in
the defendant's control and, therefore, subject to a proper seizure.
Nevertheless, the Court stated that, although it had never directly
answered the contraband question, the previous assumption that one's

33.

Id. at 392.

34.

Id.

35. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
223 (1960) (recognizing need to keep judiciary from becoming conspirator in use of illegally

obtained evidence); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exciusionaor
Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365, 377-78 (1981) (four
principles underlying Weeks exclusionary rule: (1) avoiding unfairness; (2) preventing further
privacy invasion; (3) avoiding appearance of court profiting by police wrong; and (4) preserving
judicial integrity)).
36. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
37. See Stewart, supra note 11, at 1375.
38. 269 U.S. 20, 31-32 (1925).
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house is safe from warrantless search was valid unless incident to a
lawful arrest on the premises.3 9 Justice Butler reasoned that "[t]he
protection of the fourth amendment extends to all equally, . . . to
those justly suspected or accused, as well as to the innocent.' ' 40 Justice
Butler concluded that any warrantless search of a private dwelling,
whether revealing contraband or not, was constitutionally unreasonable. Except in specified instances, including those incident to an arrest,
the Court found no justification for the search of a private dwelling
without a warrant. The Court further concluded that a belief, no
matter how reasonable, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling
furnishes no justification for a search without a warrant.4 1 The Agnello
Court then excluded the evidence and thus erased any doubt about
extension of Weeks to protect individuals from unlawful searches, regardless of facts tending to prove the existence of probable cause.
Both Weeks and Agnello seemed to base their decisions to exclude
evidence primarily on the sanctity of the privacy of the home and
restraint on police discretion to enter private dwellings. As in
Olmstead, in which Justice Brandeis mentioned an interplay between
the fourth and fifth amendments, 43 Agnello returned to Justice Bradley's reasoning in Boyd.- Agnello underscored the association of ideas
between fourth amendment security from unreasonable search and
fifth amendment freedom from incriminating admission of the fruits
from such a search. This association, though compelling, has been
disregarded in the more recent cases because courts have decided the
fourth amendment implies its own exclusionary remedy. The fifth
amendment safeguard from self-incrimination is no longer available as
now, of
a buttress for the fourth amendment. The fifth amendment
45
course, operates mainly in the area of coerced confessions.
2. Concepts of Federalism
In 1949, the Supreme Court in Wolfv. Colorado46 upheld the vitality
of the exclusionary rule in the federal context. However, the Court

39.

Id. at 32.

40.
41.

Id.
Id.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 35.
277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Boyd, 116 U.S. 616.
See 269 U.S. at 34.
338 U.S. 25 (1949).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 16

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

refused to mandate state adoption of the remedy. 47 Although the Court
did not appear to separate the right from its remedy in a federal
setting, in Wolf it did separate the two in a prosecution in a state
court for a state crime.41 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court,
argued that the rule was a judicial creation. 49 The Court agreed that
the fourth amendment guaranty against unreasonable search and seizure applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment due
process clause, but insisted that the inferential remedy of exclusion
was not constitutionally mandated. Although Justice Frankfurter
found the warrantless search inconsistent with basic constitutional
concepts of human rights, he deferred to the states, concluding that
they could penalize police intrusion in other ways. 50
The position of the Court in Wolf spawned confusion among state
courts. 51 The doctrine of comity did not begin to wither until Mapp.
Yet, after Mapp and incorporation, the flood of state cases to the
Supreme Court probably had something to do with the indecisive due
process exclusionary analysis.52
3. State Court Compliance: Reasonable Extension of
the Exclusionary Rule
Mapp is the crucial case in the development of the exclusionary
rule, both for its modification of Wolf and for its articulation of grounds
for an exclusionary rule. The facts in Mapp are neat and clean. The
police conducted a search in clear violation of the fourth amendment.5
The Court held that evidence obtained as a result of that search was
inadmissible at trial. The Court stated that Wolf had extended the
fourth amendment right of privacy to states by way of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause.- Clearly, Wolf stood for an extension
of fourth amendment rights to individuals being tried in state courts.

47. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 35, at 380.
48. 338 U.S. at 25-26.
49. Id. at 28.
50. Id. ("How such arbitrary conduct should be checked, what remedies against it should
be afforded, the means by which the right should be made effective, are all questions that are
not to be so dogmatically answered as to preclude the varying solutions which spring from an
allowable range of judgment on issues not susceptible of quantitative solution.").
51. See generally Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and
Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621.
52. See Geller, supra note 51, at 628-29; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supranote 35, at 380.
53. 367 U.S. at 655-57.
54. Id. at 644-45.
55. Id. at 655.
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The difference between Mapp and Wolf was that Mapp recognized
that the right carried with it the concomitant remedy of exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence.
Mapp principally supported an extension of the exclusionary rule
for three reasons.5 First, the majority found the rule an essential,
inextricable element of the fourth amendment, because it protected
the individual's constitutional rights.57 This justification was much the
same as reasons expressed earlier. The defendant should be free from
unwarranted invasions of privacy in the home. Law enforcement officers should identify items to be seized and demonstrate probable cause
before a search. The most direct redress of an individual invasion of
privacy is exclusion because this remedy puts the individual back in
the position the individual would have occupied before the unlawful
intrusion, as though no privacy invasion occurred.5
Second, and most important, the Court found that exclusion promoted judicial integrity. 59 The evidence-gathering role of the police
was directly related to the evidence-admitting function of the courts.
As Justice Brennan reiterated much later, with this close connection
in mind, "courts ... cannot be absolved of responsibility for the means
by which evidence is obtained." 6
Third, Mapp recognized the deterrence rationale that appeared as
a major justification for the rule.61 If the rule would deter illegal police
searches, then such prevention supported the rule's extension. The
Court had finally disassociated itself from unlawful activities of other
governmental agencies. Having done this, the Court was able to conduct itself in a manner befitting its role in the constitutional scheme,
as an agency that would not be a party to lawless invasions of privacy.
The Court would not allow profiteering from lawless acts of government. The rise to prominence of the integrity basis for the rule may
have started before Mapp; however, in Mapp it became one of the
main reasons adopted to justify the application of the exclusionary
rule.6 As a result, deterrence became the focal point and its rationale

56. See id. at 655-57.
57. Id. at 656-57.
5S. See Ingber, Defending the Citadel: The Dangerous Attack of "ReasonableGood Faith,"
36 VAND. L. REV. 1511, 1536-37 (1983).
59. 367 U.S. at 659.
60. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 937 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. 367 U.S. at 658.
62. Id. at 656-59.
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gradually became the main ingredient of the rule. In fact, the Court
had narrowed the rule's application.6
B.

The Exclusionary Rule Post Mapp

After Mapp, the distinction between the procedural requirements
of the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule began to blur. 2
The application of the rule was no longer a separate jurisprudential
subject somewhat removed from substantive search and seizure law.5
In Mapp, the Court did not decide what the police can or cannot do.
Rather, the Court concluded that it would not tolerate collusion between police and the judge. Therefore, when the police fail to comply
with rules regulating search and seizure, the fourth amendment concept of due process is implicated and requires exclusion of the evidence.
To do otherwise would undermine trust in government in general and
the judiciary in particular.
A search that was lawful before Mapp was lawful afterward. In
Mapp, however, the Court supplied, through a due process analysis, a
remedy against lawlessness that had permitted arbitrary governmental behavior that resulted in an unwarranted invasion of privacy. The
purpose of the remedy was to discourage in practice what the Court
condemned in theory. The Court noted that even if lower courts
punished individual officers or found a way to take punitive steps
against the government fostering the violation, the usual result was
the introduction of the ill-gotten fruits. This result was, therefore,
tantamount to substituting a vague doctrine of fair play for strict
procedural adherence and would probably cause the dissipation of fairness as a value within the fourth amendment.

63. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484-85 (1976) (deterrence as the primary justification
for the exclusionary rule in Mapp); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536 (1975) (deterrence
rather than judicial integrity the primary focus of the Court in considering retroactive application
of exclusionary rule); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974) (exclusionary rule's
primary purpose is police deterrence rather than the redress of search victim's rights).
64. Dawson, The Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence: A Comparative Study, 31
INTrL & CoMP. L.Q. 513, 513-14 (1982); see also Ingber, supra note 58, at 1554 (Mapp changed
remedy for, not substantive standards of, fourth amendment violations). Both of these sources
cite to Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement: The Problem of
Compliance by Police Departments, 44 TEx. L. REV. 939, 941 (1966), in which the author
laments the traumatic effects of the Mapp decision. The author discusses modification of procedures and promulgation of new standards required by the New York City police department.
Both Ingber and Dawson underscore the irony of this complaint, which is really an admission
of guilt. Mapp did not change the rules; it simply clarified the wages of transgression.
65. See Dawson, supra note 64, at 515.
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1. Deterrence as a Rationale
Well before the present Supreme Court settled on the more limited
approach to the purpose of exclusion, individual judges and commentators impugned the exclusionary rule as an ineffectual deterrent.6
Justice Jackson, in Irvine v. California,67 argued that the deterrence
justification lacked foundation. He questioned the reliability of empirical evidence showing that police malpractice decreased as a result of
the rule. Moreover, he enumerated several of what he considered fatal
flaws in the rule.6 According to Jackson, the exclusionary rule results
in the escape of guilty persons and that result "is more capable of
demonstration than that it deters invasion of right by the police .... 69
He pointed out that exclusion inures only to the benefit of the defendant with something to hide, but does nothing to vindicate the rights
of truly innocent victims of illegal searches that turn up nothing. The
police are rebuked for their miscarriage only if the intuitive conclusions
they reach turn out to be correct and they find something incriminating. Those who fear the onslaught of crime today invoke Justice
Jackson's logic and cite his observation as a reason to dispense with
the exclusionary rule or, at least, to curtail its application to those
situations in which it will most clearly deter police infractions.
2.

Calandraand Its Impact Upon the Fate
of the Exclusionary Rule

Two of the more notable cases in which the exclusionary rule has
been confined are United States v. Calandra7o and United States v.
Williams.7 1 Both are presented to illustrate, first, the trend in the
Court, and second, the signals that this trend has sent to lower federal
courts. In Calandra,the Court refused to allow a grand jury witness
to decline to answer questions based on illegally seized evidence. The
majority stressed the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule and
stated that this purpose would not be furthered by barring admission

66. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 135 (1954); see, e.g., Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 665, 674-75 (1970) (praising Justice Jackson's
candor in admitting the lack of hard evidence that the exclusionary rule was an effective deter-

rent).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

347 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1954).
Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 136.
414 U.S. 338 (1974).
622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
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of the evidence because the evidence would not be used at trial. The
Court concluded that this "collateral use" of evidence was permissible. 2
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that regardless of the collateral
use, evidence illegally obtained and used, even indirectly, to compel
testimony, entangles the courts in the illegal acts of government
agents.- Significantly, Justice Brennan's dissent quoted Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States,74 a case the Calandra Court circumscribed. Silverthorne, decided in 1920, was one of the first cases
to prohibit the use of indirect fruits of illegally obtained evidence. The
Court distinguished Silverthorne primarily on the grounds that, in
Silverthorne, the grand jury had already indicted the defendants,
thereby triggering the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination. In Calandra, the witness was granted immunity and, thus,
not subject to prosecution. Calandraalso revived the Wolf reasoning
that the exclusionary rule operates as "a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard fourth amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved." 75
United States v. Williams followed Calandra by six years. In
Williams, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
took its cue from the Supreme Court's announced dissatisfaction with
the rule and added a far-reaching exception that allows direct use of
illegally obtained evidence at trial. The defendant in Williams was
seen in Ohio in violation of a probation restriction imposed in another
matter. The government official who recognized her searched her purse
and found heroin. The officer then opened her luggage and found
larger amounts of the drug and subsequently arrested her for possession of a controlled substance and drug trafficking. The evidence was

72. 414 U.S. at 347-48; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (illegally obtained
evidence admissible in civil suit); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488-89 (1975) (Court found
'Incremental" deterrent effect of exclusionary rule and refused to extend application); Oregon
v. Haas, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (illegally obtained evidence admitted to attack defendant's credibility
if defendant takes stand); United States v. Alderman, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (illegally obtained
evidence admitted against defendant because defendant not the victim of the illegal search);
United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975) (illegally obtained evidence allowed for
use in probation or revocation proceeding); United States v. Schiponi, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1970) (unlawfully obtained evidence permitted for use in sentencing decision).

73. 414 U.S. at 364 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S.
41, 51 (1972)).
74. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
75. 414 U.S. at 348. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 35, at 385 (points out inconsistency of this position with Court's continued adherence to standing criteria).
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obtained illegally; the defendant's probation violation did not provide
grounds for a search; and her presence in Ohio did not give officers
probable cause to suspect she was trafficking in heroin. Nevertheless,
the court, faced with an irresistable counter-example, determined that
the officer's good faith mitigated the circumstances of the arrest and
militated strongly against exclusion. 76 The only way the court could
reach such a conclusion was by concentration on deterrence as the
only valid consideration in the exclusion decision. If the rule would
not deter arbitrary police behavior, then the Fifth Circuit Court
reasoned that justification to enforce it did not exist.Y
The court then proceeded to balance the costs and benefits of
excluding probative evidence. The Williams court stressed that imposition of any remedy is tied directly to the cost and benefits resulting
from its enforcement. The cost would be denying a jury access to
severely inculpating evidence highly probative of the fact that the
defendant was engaged in trafficking a dangerous narcotic. The official's lawlessness was minor in comparison to the defendant's misconduct. In fact, the court's view of the record suggests that the officer's
misunderstanding of the fourth amendment proved his lack of bad
faith and, thus, to penalize him would have no deterrent effect on his
conduct. 7s The court's epithetical approach was a simple way of avoiding conceptual difficulties. Its approach ignored reasonable methodology and bypassed Mapp by assigning its own relative weight to judicial
integrity.
3.

A Good Faith Exception

Taking a page from Williams, the Supreme Court, in 1984, announced a significant change in the relationship of the fourth amendment to the exclusionary rule. Previously, the Court had found the
exclusionary rule inapplicable in matters not directly related to prosecution of the defendant in the specific case under scrutiny. United

76. 622 F.2d at 840, 846-47. A year later the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent
Crime seemed to approve of the reasoning of the majority in Williams. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 55 (1981).

77. 622 F.2d at 840-41.
78. See Dawson, supra note 64, at 525-29 (thorough analysis of Williams decision pointing
out that police officer's state of mind determinable only at trial level and not reviewable on
appeal because a fact issue; situation creates virtual immunity from review on appeal of trial
judge's determination).
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States v. Leon 9 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard,8 however, abandoned
the previously inviolable principle that illegally obtained evidence must
not be admitted at a defendant's trial if it is part of the prosecution's
case-in-chief. The exception, formulated in Leon, appears to be limited.
The exclusionary rule was modified to allow a prosecutor to use illegally obtained evidence in the case-in-chief against a defendant only if
the officers who violated proper procedure, acted in reasonable "reliance on a search warrant [which was] issued by a detached and
neutral magistrate that ultimately is found to be defective.""1
The facts in Leon, similar to those in Williams, concerned drug
possession and distribution. The defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and with possession of methaqualone and cocaine. Unlike Williams, which involved a warrantless
search, in Leon a warrant was issued, but without probable cause.
The officers in Leon prepared an affidavit to take before a magistrate.
They relied both on confidential information given by an informant
and on their own investigation of the matter. The informant's knowledge was stale and the officers failed to establish the tipster's credibility, so, at both the trial and appellate level, the courts excluded
the evidence.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower decisions and applied a
good faith exception. The Court might have based its ruling on a
finding from the record that the officers had shown probable cause,
but instead, it formulated a new rule. The Court clearly stated that,
despite its finding that the warrant was defective under the fourth
amendment, the evidence was admissible because the officers acted
inreasonable good faith. It mattered little to the Court that the evidence illegally obtained is not a power the government has authority
to exercise.
The Court justified its result on four grounds. First, the Court
said that exclusion was a judicially-created rule and not a required
corollary of the fourth amendment. Second, and most perplexing, the
Court argued that the use of illegally obtained evidence was not a
separate constitutional wrong. According to the majority, the constitutional wrong was accomplished by the police invasion. Once the wrong

79. 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see also LaFave, The Seductive Call of Expediency: United States
v. Leon, Its Rationaleand Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 895 (questioning the cost/benefit
basis of the good faith exception and lamenting that an expansive reading of Leon would emasculate the exclusionary rule).
80. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
81. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907.
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occurred, the time had passed for the judiciary to cure it. Consequently, use at trial of the fruits of the search constituted no new
fourth amendment violation. Under this reasoning, the court below
could never be a party to lawless governmental invasions because by
the time the matter came to the attention of the judiciary, it would
be too late to withhold the constitutional imprimatur. Third, the Court
concluded that to exclude the evidence would not deter police misconduct. s "- The Court once again argued that deterrence was the primary
function of the rule. Fourth, the Court justified its exception to exclusion by applying the Williams cost-benefit balancing analysis. The
Court found that the scales tipped heavily in favor of the good faith
exception. The costs of exclusion were that some guilty defendants
would receive reduced sentences or escape punishment altogether.
The benefits of exclusion, the Court averred, were minor, especially
when police acted in "objectively reasonable reliance" on a neutral
magistrate's issuance of a warrant. 3
In dissenting opinions, Justices Brennan and Stevens rejected the
majority approach. Justice Brennan refused to accept the conclusion
that the exclusionary rule was judicially created or that it was not
equally incumbent on the police and the courts to honor it. In his
opinion, when one arm of the government misused evidence, exclusion
became a constitutional imperative. The fourth amendment restrains
the whole power of the government, not just a particular agency while
all others are exempt. "[The] police and the courts cannot be regarded
as constitutional strangers to each other . . . ."8 Justice Brennan
argued that the primary intention behind all searches is to gather
evidence for a trial. He rejected the majority's reliance on the deterrence rationale as the principal purpose of exclusion. He stressed that
the rule's function was not so much to deter police malpractice as it
was to allow review of the constitutionality of search and seizure law

82. Id. at 906-13. The Court stated:
Many of these researchers have concluded that the impact of the exclusionary
rule is insubstantial, but the small percentages with which they deal mask a large
absolute number of felons who are released because the cases against them were
based in part on illegal searches and seizures .... Because we find that the rule
can have no substantial deterrent effect in the sorts of situations under consideration in this case,

. .

.we conclude [the rule] cannot pay ..

.

Id. at 907-08 n.6.
8:3. Id. at 922.
84. Id. at 936-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393). I believe Justice
Brennan is correct in urging the exclusionary rule as a matter of constitutional right. The use
of illegally obtained evidence is as much a constitutional violation as the initial search and seizure.
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and to provide guidance from the courts to keep fourth amendment law
from being frozen in place. 5 Justice Brennan seems to recognize the
Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, thus suggesting that the
Court must at all times avoid the taint of collusion between police and
judge. To do otherwise condemns the Court to a partnership role in
lawless activity.
Finally, Justice Brennan rejected the majority's cost-benefit
analysis. He argued that the majority's balancing approach was inherently unstable and inadequately supported by empirical evidence s6
Even if he were to endorse the majority approach, Justice Brennan
would disagree with the majority's conclusions. According to his data,
assessments in more recent studies showed lost convictions resulting
from the exclusionary rule were minimal. Moreover, according to Justice Brennan, the majority's narrow focus on individual cases was
myopic, blinding the majority to the broader function of the exclusionary rule "to promote institutional compliance with Fourth Amendment
requirements on the part of law enforcement agencies generally."7
Not only did Justice Brennan disapprove of the cost-benefit test, he
also believed that the Court misstated the costs of the rule. The fact
that some criminals go free was not so much a cost of the exclusionary
rule as it was a cost of the fourth amendment. Criminals go free,
Justice Brennan declared, "because official compliance with the fourth
amendment requirements makes it more difficult to catch [them]." 88
The fourth amendment itself, therefore, commands the Court to disassociate itself from illegal police conduct. The fourth amendment demands that the Court serve as a buffer between government and
people.
Justice Stevens attacked the majority's approach and attempted
to expose its infirmity from a semantic standpoint.' Because searches
made with invalid warrants were, by definition, constitutionally unreasonable, Justice Stevens contended that the fourth amendment required exclusion of any illegally obtained evidence the searches produced. The question arises, as well, how an officer may reasonably rely

85. Id. at 944-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Inherently unstable" balancing test criticized).
86. Id. at 950-51 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 953 & n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 941 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan explained that the loss of evidence was
the cost society must pay to enjoy freedom and privacy safeguarded by the fourth amendment.
Id.
89. Id. at 960 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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on a constitutionally unreasonable warrant. The answer seems to be
an inverted tautology, reasonable reliance on the unreasonable.9
Additionally, Justice Stevens was uncomfortable with the judicial
formulation of the "good faith" exception. He believed the Court had
gone beyond what was "necessary to decide the case before it."'91 When
a court does that, Justice Stevens warned, "it can only encourage the
perception that it is pursuing its own notions of wise social policy,
rather than adhering to its judicial role."92 Justice Stevens asserted
that, if the majority were genuinely interested in upholding the rule
when its deterrent function was most evident, then it would not adopt
the "good faith" exception. According to Justice Stevens, if police
cannot use evidence obtained through warrants based on less than
probable cause, they have less incentive to seek those warrants and
magistrates feel less compulsion to issue them. Under the new rule,
even when police know their warrant application is very likely insufficient to show probable cause, Justice Stevens' analysis is that the
officers might still submit these to magistrates if they see an outside
chance that the magistrate might "take the bait." In other words,
Stevens' concern was that, while exclusion might not keep the police
honest, the new exception only serves to remove incentives to remain
truthful. 3
The companion case to Leon, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, illustrates the uncertainty in the law resulting from Leon. Sheppard is an
example of a factually compelling case that seems to demand a "good
faith" exception to ensure that the most reprehensible criminals are
dealt with forcibly. Yet, if abstracted from its own factual setting,

90. Id. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Both Kamisar and Ingber, relying to an extent on
Kamisar's analysis, point out the conceptual flaw in reasonable misunderstanding of the fourth
amendment. See Y. KAmISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
22 (5th ed. 1980) (seventy to ninety percent of prosecuted cases result in guilty pleas); Ingber,
supra note 58, at 1559 (refuting the perception that the exclusionary rule hamstrings police
because "[w]hile the exclusionary rule only functions to suppress evidence at trial, our criminal

justice system focuses more on obtaining guilty pleas than on securing convictions at trial").
91.
92.
93.

468 U.S. at 962-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 963 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 974 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Stevens explained it,
[i]f the police cannot use evidence obtained through warrants issued on less than
probable cause, they have less incentive to seek those warrants, and magistrates
have less incentive to issue them ....
Under the majority's new rule, even when
the police know their warrant application is probably insufficient, they retain an

incentive to submit it to a magistrate, on the chance that he may take the bait.
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the holding stands for the proposition that the officer's faith need only
be good and not necessarily reasonable.
In Sheppard, the police submitted an adequate affidavit showing
probable cause to believe evidence connecting the suspect with a brutal
murder would be found at his dwelling. 4 The officers applied for the
warrant on a Sunday, when the appropriate type of warrant was not
available. Instead of the proper form, the magistrate used a warrant
form designed for narcotics searches. The magistrate made several
changes in the warrant, but did not obliterate the search authorization
language or try to replace it with more specific language describing
the items to be seized. The officers, who had written the affidavit
describing with particularity what was to be seized, relied on the
warrant and, in fact, seized the very evidence they expected to find.
The evidence was clear: Sheppard had raped and murdered the
victim. Most would recoil from a justice system that allowed such a
felon to escape prosecution because of a mere technicality. Not surprisingly, the Court found that the officers acted in good faith reliance
on the warrant and, therefore, the fourth amendment failure to describe the "things to be seized" would not result in exclusion of the
95
evidence.
In Leon, the Court carefully articulated several instances in which
the good faith exception would not be activated, even if the officers
had no intention of violating the fourth amendment. The Court resolved that the exclusionary rule would still apply in the event of a
facially deficient warrant, especially one that completely failed to
specify the items to be seized. In such a case, reliance on the warrant
would be unreasonable and the good faith exception would not operate.
Yet, in Sheppard, the majority showed that at the very least this
exception will be construed broadly. The Court held that a warrant
describing drugs instead of evidence of murder was still reliable because an underlying affidavit correctly identified the items.9 Yet, the
underlying affidavit did not satisfy the purpose of the fourth amend-

94. For a precise statement of the facts, see Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488,
441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), rev'd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
95. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 990-91.
96. Id. This result leads one to wonder about the purpose of identifying items with specificity
in a warrant. The person being searched deserves at least to know the reason behind a police
invasion. Although the warrant, of course, is for the officer's benefit to assist in limiting the
search, seemingly the rationale behind the requirement serves a function in informing the person
whose privacy is disturbed as well. That way, the individual can evaluate the reasonableness
of the invasion to determine whether to take action against oppressive police behavior.
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ment, which is to provide the person being searched with some reason
for the search - a proper justification. Suspects or innocent persons
who are searched never see affidavits. Apparently, in this case, good
faith is reliance on a warrant, but not on its content.
Justices Brennan's and Stevens' dissents in Leon voiced their concerns over Sheppard as well. Although Justice Stevens believed for
other reasons that the evidence should not be excluded, he did express
concerns about the reasonableness of the officers' reliance on the warrant. Justice Stevens maintained that the police may never reasonably
rely on the mere fact of issuance and should always examine the
warrant, and in a case like Sheppard they might, at least, have tried
7
to change it.9
The vague Sheppard warrant did not comply with fourth

amendment standards and, thus, any search conducted pursuant to it
was unconstitutional.
The logical conclusion to Justice Stevens' syllogism is that the
police who violated the fourth amendment in Sheppard could not qualify for the "reasonable" good faith standard. As Justice Stevens
explained:
Today, for the first time, this Court holds that although the
Constitution has been violated, no court should do anything
about it at any time and in any proceeding ....Courts simply
cannot escape their responsibility for redressing constitutional
violations if they admit evidence obtained through unreasonable
search and seizures, since the entire point of the police conduct
that violates the fourth amendment is to obtain evidence for
use at trial.98
Justice Brennan's concerns, delineated previously, are equally
applicable in Sheppard. Just as the lack of probable cause in Leon
showed that the issuance of the warrant was unreasonable, automatic
reliance on the magistrate's incorrectly worded warrant was also unreasonable. As Justice Brennan envisioned it, the Court "gave way
to the seductive call of expediency"' in both cases and in so doing
forsook its commitment to protect individual liberty and privacy.
C. The Fate of the Fourth Amendment
The fate of the fourth amendment is difficult to predict. The status
quo will undoubtedly change, and as the fear of crimes against persons

97.

Leon, 468 U.S. at 974 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

98. Id. at 977-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99.

Id. at 930 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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increases, the rights of the accused for these compelling governmental
reasons are likely to be diminished. Several advantages and disadvantages to the modern trend have emerged in the past few years; most
of these have been developed and discussed in the cases cited. An
analysis of the rationale underlying those cases might aid in a better
understanding of the "benefits" to be derived from a less stringent
exclusionary rule.
1. The Focus of the Present Court
It would seem that a majority of the present Court1°o has found
several reasons justiflying both limitations on the exclusionary rule
and broad exceptions to its mandate. The societal costs of exclusion
are manifold. Doubtless, the rule can divert the truth-finding process
at trials. If applied in cases like Sheppard or Leon, it would most
surely free guilty parties. Additionally, the failure to convict and incarcerate known criminals can generate disrespect for the justice system. Even if reliable statistics and empirical studies demonstrate that
felons escape punishment as a result of exclusion, a popular perception
that crime is on the rise might suggest that institutional legitimacy
requires inclemency against the accused and leniency towards the
police. The perceived disproportionality in individual cases between
the police error "and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule

. .

.," as the Court has suggested, "is contrary to

the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice."'101
One commentator has suggested that, not only does the rule divert
truth-seeking, free the guilty, and diminish credibility of law enforcement; it does all of this under a purported constitutional imperative
that does not appear in the express words of the Constitution.1 2 The
only concrete right announced in the search and seizure provision is
the right to be free from lawless intrusion. The amendment provides
no enforcement mechanism. Because the present majority of the Court
sees great social costs rather than benefits and because it perceives
a general failure of the rule to deter police misconduct, particularly
when police act in good faith, it has limited application of the exclusionary remedy.

100.

I would include within this majority Justice Antonin Scalia.

101.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1975).

102. See generally L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE
OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY (1985) (explaining politics of Supreme
Court and pointing out that all justices are activists on behalf of their own constitutional visions).
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2. The Beleaguered Justice Brennan and Friends
Justices Brennan and Stevens, and numerous commentators, have
demonstrated many disadvantages inherent in the majority approach.
Commentators have catalogued these disadvantages. 10 3 What follows
is a brief recapitulation of the recurrent criticisms of both the good
faith exception and any other attempt to limit the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence. The criticisms fall generally into five basic
categories. 04
First, exclusion is not a part of the plain language of the fourth
amendment; however, the doctrine of judicial integrity might require
exclusion in order to prevent the courts from appearing to become
accessories to police lawlessness.05 Second, the rule, when viewed in
individual cases, may not deter police misconduct but, when viewed
systematically, may be a powerful general deterrent.106 Third, the
cost-benefit analysis is self-fulfilling when applied to exclusion. Statistics are easy to compile about the number of guilty individuals who
go free or receive reduced sentences. These are affirmative occurrences. To the contrary, those who would prove systematic deterrence
and increased police and judicial integrity are disadvantaged by having
to prove a negative. It is difficult to amass empirical data to prove
that the existence of the rule prevented a precisely calculated number
of unlawful searches and seizures. Fourth, as Justice Brennan has
suggested, adoption of the good faith exception will "stop dead in its
tracks"1°7 the development and spread of knowledge about fourth
amendment substantive law.os Courts will seldom reach the search

103. See supra notes 58 & 64.
104. See Note, I Come Not to Praise the Exclusionary Rule But to Bury It, 18 CREIGHTON
L. REV.819, 848 (1985).
105. Id. Note, id., mentions six reasons. This article combines judicial integrity with the
personal constitutional right because judicial integrity involves a respect for the rights of the

individual and an unwillingness to participate in constitutional violations or to benefit by them.
106. See Ingber, supra note 58, at 1542-52.
107. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
LaFave, The FourthAmendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "BrightLines" and "Good
Faith," 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 354-55 (1982) (advocating limited interpretation of the good
faith exception because good faith issue should be considered only after search and seizure has
been determined illegal).
108. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 35, at 402-03:
The exclusionary rule not only prevents fourth amendment violations.. . , but
also is indispensible to the development of law by the lower courts .... Given
both the myriad factual situations that the police encounter and the often unpredictable variations within even common patterns, reducing probable cause to a
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and seizure issue since police good faith allegations give officers a
much more flexible hold on opportunities that circumvent the fourth
amendment. Fifth, critics believe the rule will tempt officers to violate
the fourth amendment through the good faith exception.1°9 Especially
when dealing with a guilty defendant, officers will rationalize a justification for violating constitutional procedures. Placing this sort of temptation in front of law enforcement officers seems unfair, especially
because enforcers who see the ravages of crime tend to view themselves as above the law and might manipulate it to achieve what they
believe is a just result. 110
Despite all the criticisms of the new good faith exception, public
trust in the law is essential to preserve society. Even though the
minority view seems intellectually tempting, without practical application, it is of little moment. The fourth amendment, with the disclaimer
"unreasonable," is one of the more pragmatic amendments, at least
as far as its societal outlook is concerned. Perhaps alternative remedies
are available to exclusion of the fruits of an illegal search.
D.

Potential PragmaticAlternatives to Achieve the
Goals of Exclusion

The former Chief Justice has suggested that reasonable options to
a strict exclusionary rule exist and should be used in the alternative.,
He argues that proponents of the rule ascribe far too much value to
it.112

Essentially, alternatives must do three things to accomplish the

goals of exclusion. First, any viable alternative must protect the rights

set formula is an impossible task. Nevertheless, by deciding fourth amendment
cases, courts are able to define probable cause more precisely. Thus, through this
continual refinement, the police can become more certain of when probable cause
exists and when it is lacking.
Id.
109. See Quick, Attitudinal Aspects of Police Compliance with ProceduralDue Process, 6
Am. J. CRIM. LAW. 25, 34-40 (1978) (police behavioral adjustments to exclusionary rule).
110. See Ingber, supra note 58, at 1523.
111. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 420 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger said the exclusionary rule was experimental,
not required, and, he believed, a failure. Id. at 415. Therefore, alternatives to uphold the fourth
amendment purpose should be developed in its place. Id. at 420. Burger recommended several
legislative guidelines for alternatives. Id. at 421-23.
112. Id. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Others have also been vocal opponents of the
exclusionary rule and echo many of Burger's sentiments. See Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule:
Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 214, 223 (1978); see also Oaks, supra note 66,

passim (examining the exclusionary rule's effect on police search and seizure behavior).
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of individuals who suffer in specific cases because of police misconduct
a purpose now served by the fact finding at suppression hearings.
Second, the alternative to exclusion must also compensate the individual whose rights are infringed - a purpose presently served by
exclusion of the improperly seized evidence. Third, any process or
technique used to replace the exclusionary rule must both deter future
police misconduct and educate law enforcement officials about prevailing legal standards - a twin goal currently fulfilled by the suppression
hearing and judicial opinion writing.
Several methods have been suggested for reviewing police procedure, addressing recriminations of those whose fourth amendment
rights are infringed, and deterring police misconduct. The first of
these are the external review alternatives, which are reviews by nonpolice advisory boards. These civilian review boards weigh evidence
in individual cases, award damages, enjoin certain practices, and impose sanctions to discipline police. Many of these lay tribunals operated
in the United States in the 1960s, among them the Philadelphia Police
Advisory Board and the New York Civilian Complaint Review
Board.113 Very few, if any, remain in the 1980s.1 1 4 The main opposition
to such review boards comes from implacable police forces who fear
deleterious effects and, as a rule, refuse to cooperate- with citizen
enforcement groups. Thus, the external review concept has been
largely abandoned.
The second method of providing an alternative remedy to exclusion
has been the internal review process or administrative rulemaking by
police departments themselves.15 Despite the inherent tendentiousness of self-imposed review, at least the police find enforcement by
their own superiors less inimical to their law enforcement goals than
civilian review. As several commentators have observed, police behavior is frequently governed by internal norms and the police will
usually accept as legitimate only the internal when they are in the
streets, not in the chambers. If the police, for whatever reasons ignore
or disobey the law in practice, the court cannot follow suit with the law
in theory. Law enforcement personnel should not be in a position to
make or interpret the rules they enforce. If they are so permitted,
then society is faced with the contradictory alliance of the controller

113. See Note, Grievance Response Mechanisms for Police Misconduct, 55 VA. L. REV.
909, 940 (1969).
114. See Dawson, supra note 64, at 531.
115. See generally Kaplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 500 (1971).
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and the controlled in one institution, thus paving the way for a victimization of the most vulnerable. The new partnership will certainly lead
to lawless invasions, but, more importantly, it has the potential for
undermining public confidence in the Constitution.116
The third type of remedial substitute for the exclusionary rule is
the civil remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.117 Initially, this alternative
was appealing. The guilty party, incarcerated as a result of evidence
obtained illegally instead of going unpunished would simply have a
cause of action against the officer who conducted the search or against
the law enforcement agency under a respondeatsuperioranalogy. This
alternative potentially preserves the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system for those who take an uncompromising stand against crime,
while providing a check on arbitrary police conduct. The police force
could no longer afford to violate criminal procedures. Irrespective of
the ostensible allure of a statutory tort claim, this third alternative
to exclusion is really no more practicable than the previous two.
Problems abound with civil remedies. The most formidable hurdle
for anyone suing under section 1983 is the officer's intent. If the officer
lacked the requisite unlawful intent, the statute will bar recovery
completely. Proving gross or culpable negligence is an almost insurmountable burden, similar to showing that an officer was not acting
in reasonable good faith. The best a potential plaintiff could hope to
do would be to show total ignorance or disregard for indisputable law.
Such flagrant disregard seldom occurs, and even when it does, search
and seizure law is inscrutable enough that no one could ever prove
the officer's bad faith. As if this burden were not difficult enough,
the potential plaintiff enters any legal action disadvantaged as a confirmed wrongdoer. This individual is likely to have little or no credibility with a judge or jury. As a prisoner, the individual might fear
future harrassment from law enforcement personnel. Furthermore,
the person suing in such an action would likely be impecunious and,

116.

See Dawson, supra note 64, at 532:
[Tihe judiciary must continue to exercise jurisdiction over the content of the rules,
to ensure their legality, and over compliance with them in individual cases. To
do otherwise would be to allow a situation in which the police make the rules and
enforce the rules, surely a definition of a police state.

Id.
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual
Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493, 509 (1955); McCaffrey, Recent Developments in 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 Claims Against Municipalities and Their Police Departments, 15 FORUM 747,
751 (1980).
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if in prison, would have no income to pay attorney's fees. Success in
a civil action seems a remote possibility for a plaintiff facing so many
obstacles.
Strangely, if an individual succeeded in a civil action against the
police, the results might actually have a more profound deterrent
effect on law enforcement than the exclusionary rule. Although Chief
Justice Burger and others have called for formulation of a more effective deterrent than exclusion, the question arises whether that is
really what they want. The police officers who actually conduct
searches are seldom well paid and are frequently at risk. If the civil
suit is to be a deterrent, field officers might begin to conduct their
own microeconomic cost-benefit analysis and give up searching altogether. If fomth amendment law is actually intolerably obscure,
officers may refuse to take chances for fear of financial hardship. So,
fewer defendants would go free because of a fourth amendment violation, but fewer would be brought to justice as well.
Of course, this overkill deterrence argument eventually breaks
down because, in practice, officers probably would not pay the judgments anyway. The damages would most likely come from a general
insurance fund that would operate somewhat like malpractice insurance. The individual officer would incur no real liability and might
escape accountability for constitutional infractions.118 The result might
be that many communities, especially smaller ones, would be at financial risk.
E.

The Exclusionary Rule and InstitutionalIntegrity

The present Court evinces the doctrine of deterrence as the main
justification for exclusion. This view of the rule as a singleness of
purpose encourages disregard for vindication of individual rights and
for preservation of judicial integrity. Moreover, it draws attention
away from the actual substantive requirements of the fourth amendment. If the exclusionary rule is justified simply on deterrence
grounds, then the law has reduced its educational and moral force to
the least common denominator. The deterrence aspect of exclusion
influences only future behavior and concentrates on the "doer" - the
police officer who might conduct the illegal search. Conversely, the
vindication aspect involves a measure of retroactivity - it concentrates
on the individual to whom it was "done." If deterrence is the only

118. See geerally Dawson, supra note 64, at 531-33; see also Ingber, supra note 58, at
1552-56 (analyzing effect of good faith exception on scope of fourth amendment).
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basis for exclusion, then no reason exists to enforce the rule in those
situations in which unlawful search and seizure results from mere
police ignorance. If, on the other hand, exclusion is designed to educate
the one who violates proscribed search and seizure provisions, then
the evidence wrongfully obtained should be inadmissible even if the
violation resulted from reasonable misapprehension or ignorance.
F. Some Final Overworked Observations
1. Jurisprudential Inconsistency
In most societies the absence of an exclusionary rule or its equivalent is rather uncontroversial. Other people have accepted limitations
on individual liberties for the sake of safety. Although some argue no
such guarded society exists in the United States (where the Bill of
Rights is enshrined), exceptions, such as airport searches, do exist
for reasons of safety. Yet, these limited detours from the Bill of Rights
do not replace those rights in our society. The Bill of Rights is a
legacy inspired by concern over potential governmental oppression
more than fear for public safety. As long as the present perception
of the Bill of Rights exists, abrogation of the exclusionary rule or
limitation of its impact diminishes the symbolic force of all the constitutional amendments. The true test of any system containing a statement
of individual liberties lies in the observation of how that system imposes its own rules upon itself. The right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure means the right to be free from the repercussions
of, and the assurance that the right in question will be reviewed by,
a judicial system disassociated from the police practice. The freedom
from the initial invasion, the right to exclusion of evidence once invaded, and the assurance of judicial integrity are concatenated parts
of the central freedom guaranteed by the fourth amendment.
I would suggest that privacy is a fundamental right whether written in the Constitution or not. The framers viewed privacy from within
the context of search and seizure. 119 It matters little that the fourth
amendment was probably not intended to protect the clandestine
scheming of criminals. The drafters feared direct governmental intrusion into private lives and sought to limit such power. 120 Police regu-

119. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 19, at 735 (identifying the
oldest and best understood privacy interest protected by the Constitution as the fourth amendment guarantee of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure).
120. See Buckley, Status of Intoxicating Liquor Seized Under Authority of a Subsequently
DeclaredInvalid Search Warrant, 12 GEo. L.J. 19, 21 (1923) ("The object of the fourth amend-
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lation is not merely a means to achieve fourth amendment goals,121 it
is itself one of the goals.'2 The use and abuse of general warrants
and writs of assistance was a form of an inquisitorial process recognized
as one of the abuses of power. From that experience we insisted upon
an adversarial system, thus forcing the Court into a moral role. The
Bill of Rights requires the Court to ensure justice. If it is unjust to
admit evidence obtained in an illegal manner, then the Court is charged
with the duty of exercising its moral authority and destabilizing
popularized malice. I would suggest that security against unrestrained
police intrusion is elemental to this free society and lies at the heart
of the fourth amendment.= As a colleague put it: "the attack is upon
the citadel of the fourth amendment" and no matter how the Court
or the current executive administration may phrase it, they are disguising their agenda in a shroud of obfuscation and casuistic rhetoric.
2. Consideration of the American Concept of Judicial Interpretation
Some have suggested that the Bill of Rights is the victim of an
over politicized Supreme Court that exceeds the bounds of its authority
and creates implications out of the ethereal mist. Granted, the fourth
amendment does not specifically authorize exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. "Strict constructionists" argue that the Constitution
is a precise set of directions that usually admits but a single solution
to any legal dispute.'2- Justice Brennan has spoken of the "cloaks of

ment ... was to protect the citizen from domestic disturbance by the disorderly intrusion of
administrative officials. Such official misconduct is expressly prohibited by the amendment....").
See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390-92 (1914) (reviewing history of fourth
amendment and concluding that its purpose was to limit courts and officials in order to secure
the people against "unreasonable searches and seizures under guise of law"); J. LANDYNSKI,
supra note 6, at 20 (fourth amendment drafted for "express purpose of providing safeguards
against a recurrence of highhanded search measures"); Hill, ConstitutionalRemedies, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 1109, 1131-32 (1969) (discussing common law view that transgression of government
officer constitutes trespass).
121. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
361-62 (1974).
122. See J. LANDYNSKI,supra note 6, at 42-46; see also Adams v. New York, 192 U.S.
585, 598 (1904) ('The security intended to be guaranteed by the 4th amendment against wrongful
search and seizures is designed to prevent violations of private security in person and property
and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home of the citizen by officers of the law ....).
123. See J. LANDYNSKI, s-upra note 6, at 30-39; see also W. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND
SEIZURE 3-6 (1978) (historical survey of origins and purposes of exclusionary rule).
124. See Ingber, supra note 58, at 1557.
125. Many view a failure to exercise judicial self restraint as anti-republican. One of the
most articulate and forcible advocates of restraint was Justice Holmes, who was quoted as
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generality," the artful vagueness in which the framers dressed these
incipient words of a newly founded free society.126 Indeed, terms such
as "unreasonable searches," "due process," and "equal protection of
the law," are indeterminate until a court imbues them with meaning.
They are also part of a uniquely American terminology not frequently
heard in foreign courtrooms.
I would summarize these thoughts on the exclusionary rule with
a brief examination of the current and most fashionable constitutional
debate because I do not believe that an analysis of the exclusionary
rule is complete without a look at the institutional role played by the
Court in the rule's emergence and decline. The debate centers around
the historical question whether the Court should confine its interpretive skills to principles and policies discoverable in the text of the
Constitution or, given the complexities of a modern state, legitimately
create principles and policies based upon its perception of contemporary moral standards of the state and its people. It matters not
whether such judgment is unsupported by the written document or
apparent framer intent. 12
The case on behalf of the latter, although set forth in different
packaging, is scantly different from earlier attempts to move the Court
into the legislative or executive world of policymaking. 12 This unnovel
approach is to allege, and little more, that the Court is an unbridled
policymaker and should be accepted as such. Advocates of this view
ignore textual guidance. 129 In so doing, at the extreme, they surrender

saying, "about seventy-five years ago, I learned that I was not God. And so, when the people

. . .want to do something I can't find anything in the Constitution expressingly forbidding
them to do, I say, whether I like it or not, 'Goddamit, let 'em do it!' " C. CURTIS, LIONS
UNDER THE THRONE 281 (1947).

126. Kilpatrick, Two Ways to Interpret the Constitution, Miami Herald, Nov. 5, 1985, at
17A, col. 1.
127. Compare P. BOB3ir, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) (justification of the constitutional legitimacy of judicial review through an analysis of its functions and arguments) with M.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982) (arguing that the
Supreme Court's recent decisions on human rights are based on value judgments of the justices
themselves rather than on the Constitution or on the values of its framers).
128. Compare M. PERRY, supra note 118 (recent Supreme Court human rights decisions
based on value judgments of justices themselves), and Brest, Interpretationand Interest, 34
STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982) (highlighting contradictions and problems inherent in the constitutional
interpretive approach) with the legal realists school of the thirties, especially Frank, What
Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645 (1932) (emphasizing the inability to predict how courts
will decide a specific case because of judge's reliance on own value judgments).
129. See M. PERRY, supra note 127, at 2-18. The development of non-interpretive criticism
can be found in Lupu, Constitutional Theory and the Searchfor the Workable Premise, 8 U.
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constitutional principles to idealogues at both ends of the political
spectrum. Their core values include discarding written systems of law.
The former, for the most part, appear to begin from the premise of
constitutional legitimacy. 130 Obviously, the framers did not envision
all; yet, they did establish a structural morality that reflects a concept
of constitutionalism recognizing specific, though limited, roles for government.1 31 For example, in the abortion cases, the Court found that
governmental intrusion into the body of a woman at certain points in
her pregnancy exceeded the government's limitation mandate, for no
compelling reason. Thus, judicial review took into account the textual
132
commitment to limited governmental intrusion into private lives.
The scholarly defense of constitutional interpretation is well demonstrated in Philip Bobbitt's work, Constitutional Fate. Bobbitt's
argument is in support of the legitimacy of judicial review. Bobbitt's
analysis recognizes interpretive flexibility since the time of Marbury.
He attempts, in part, to catalogue constitutional arguments as distinguished from political policy conclusions. Bobbitt concludes that interpretivists seek constitutional accountability while non-interpretivists
ignore it.As to scholars and jurists, preoccupation with whether the Court
exceeds its constitutional mandate or remains true to the letter or,
at least, the spirit of the document, appears to be an exercise in subtle
polemics. I would agree with Professor Wellington that
[t]he process has its own built-in dynamic of evaluation. Of
course Justices are fallible. But when they make mistakes,
they hear about them: signals are sent, groups are formed,
legislation is proposed, and the public forum is heavily used.
New cases will afford the court opportunities for reevaluation.
The doctrine of stare decisis is not strong in the constitutional
realm.134

DAroN L. REv. 579 (1983); McArthur, Abandoning the Constitution: The New Wave in
Constitutional Theory, 59 TUL. L. REV. 280 (1984).
130. See generally P. BOBBITT, supra note 127, at 152; Baker & Baldwin, Eighth Amendment Challenges to the Length of a Criminal Sentence: Following the Supreme Court "from
Precedent to Precedent," 27 ARIz. L. REv. 25, 57-65 (1985).
131. See P. BOBBIrr, supra note 127, at 152.
132. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Court invalidated Texas' near-total ban
on abortions based on a woman's right to privacy) with, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(evidence obtained from unconstitutional search and seizure inadmissible).
133. See McArthur, supra note 129, at 307.
134. Wellington, Hist",y and Morals in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 97 HARV. L. REV.
326, 335 (1983).
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No amount of scholarship will change the task of the justice.
[T]he art of judging involves separating false signals from
real mistakes, whereas the consequences that a judicial decision
has for the formation of moral opinion are completely unpredictable.
In the end, judicial review is legitimate for the same reason
that common law and statutory adjudication are legitimate:
' We the People" consent. 13From this, one may glean a simple truth: nothing tells the justice
which way to decide. However, in deciding and administering "the
law," the judge cannot ignore the fact that he or she is subject to it.
Therefore, the question remains, how creative does the justice view
his or her role? The Constitution makes advocating or adopting the
more creative role the most difficult task. Certainly, cases creating
or abolishing the exclusionary rule should limit judicial creativity. If
the ultimate result is in keeping with the moral ideals of the community, then the decision will be respected by most, except perhaps the
lunatic fringe. This is, as Professor Wellington put it, not a quest for
right or wrong answers. 13 6 Simply put, if the moral conclusions square
with the community's moral conviction, the right or wrong of it becomes irrelevant. I would suggest, however, that, although the conclusions of the present Court in the exclusionary rule area are less than
constitutionally moral in their focus, at the least they reflect the current popular attitude toward crime. Under these circumstances, the
exclusionary rule is a victim rather than an instigator. For the Court
to relinquish its role to miscalculation would be a grave mistake.
"Deterrence is partly a matter of logic and psychology, largely a matter
of faith. The question is never whether laws do deter, but rather
,,137
whether conduct ought to be deterred ....
V.

CONCLUSION

I end where I began, with the standardless case development during the twilight years of the exclusionary rule that has become a

135. Id.
136. Id. at 334. Cf. Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL. L. REv.
1 (1978) (illustrating the constructive ideas that follow from the view of the Supreme Court as
a legislature).
137. Dworldn, Fact Style Adjudication and the FourthAmendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 333 (1973).
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self-fulfilling prophecy. In reaching this conclusion, I too have been
hypnotized by individual records in certain cases. In yielding to these
irresistable fact examples, it is easy to understand how the warrant
requirement has become an empty guarantee within a structureless
theory. If the rule has little deterrent impact upon the constable, and
the court has so found, then why exclude illegally obtained evidence?
Somewhere along the way to this structureless theory, the Court
seems to have lost sight of the principled basis'tm behind the rule;
which is, I thought, the integrity of the guilt determination process.
A loss of judicial integrity will, I suspect, go much farther toward an
overall realistic erosion of public faith in the guilt determination process than the implementation of majoritarian concepts of community
values reflected in the public's perception of the exclusionary rule. 139
The loss of principled decisionmaking, to the benefit of contaminated
than the Court's
evidence, is a far greater loss to our Constitution
140
adherence to perceived community fears.
I believe that the Court has now rejected a principled goal for the
fourth amendment, a goal insuring integrity, and replaced it with a
torturous and essentially unprincipled case-by-case analysis of the
rule.'14 I would assume that the members of the Court would concede
that Fuller was correct when he argued for integrity within the legal
system. Yet, as the fourth amendment grew, somewhere along the
way, the principle of integrity was abandoned and the new focus
became the principle of fear. 142 This change in direction will, I suggest,
have a profound negative impact upon the judicial branch of government. If the Court is to continue its dissection of the exclusionary
rule, and if the Court is concerned with avoiding disrepute, then its
task must be accomplished with a more principled scalpel.143

138. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal
Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.J. 518, 537.
139. For an in-depth analysis of the relationship of the exclusionary rule to integrity and
the avoidance of disrepute, see C. Gray, supra note 19.
140. See C. Gray, supra note 19, at 21-23.
141. See, e.g., Weisberger, The ExclusionaryRule: Nine Authors in Search of a Principle,
34 S.C.L. REV. 253, 272 (1982).
142. See generally T. Baker, supra note 5.
143. Cf. Baldwin, The United States Supreme Court: A Creative Check of Institutional
Misdirection?, 45 IND L.J. 550 (1970) (proposing an active role for the Supreme Court as
necessary to protect the rights of the individual vis-a-vis the community).
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